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The article by Rajat Nag effectively sets out some of the key issues in the architecture of the 
New Development Bank (NDB) and Comprehensive Reserve Arrangement (CRA), especially 
in terms of financing parameters. As he correctly points out critical details in terms of costs 
of borrowing and who the NDB will lend to, are still not clear. A lot hinges on the credibility 
of the institution in terms of lending and governance standards which will in turn affect its 
credit ratings. More importantly the CRA is likely to be too small for economies of the size of 
the BRICS countries to utilize at the time of a crisis.  
Nag correctly identifies the guiding principle behind the NDB as the need for large 
developing countries to negotiate space for themselves beyond the limiting confines of the 
IMF and the World Bank where developed countries, especially the US, still have controlling 
mandate. Previous initiatives have been regional (Corporación Andina de Fomento in Latin 
America and the Chiang Mai initiative among eastern and south east Asian countries) or 
have been like the G-77 which doesn’t have much decision making powers apart from also 
suffering huge collective action problems. The BRICS countries are however more united in 
terms of recognizing that together the political and economic clout they wield will ensure 
the NDB gets taken seriously. 
Nag highlights the diversity of the five countries that have come together to create the NDB 
but the challenges of managing this diversity may be even more than the challenges he 
highlights. Each of the five members has different strategic imperatives for coming together 
to create the bank with China, Russia and India having higher stakes than Brazil and South 
Africa. For China the NDB along with the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank that it is 
promoting is in line with challenging the dominance of the Japanese in Asia. Russia would be 
keen to participate in the NDB to shore up its falling credibility thanks to its war games in 
Ukraine. Given the Russian currency and financial crisis it will be interesting to see if the 
NDB plays any role in bailing the country out. This would of course be to India’s severe 
discomfiture as it negotiates a thaw in its relationship with the US given that the latter is 
banking heavily on economic sanctions against Russia to solve the Ukraine crisis. India is also 
trying to calibrate its relationship with China through what is increasingly looking like a 
strategy of ‘co-opetition’ given its own ambitions in South Asia and the extended Indian 
Ocean and the recognition that China is too powerful to be taken on directly. These bilateral 
tensions between the two are likely to carry into the NDB. Even if the technical architecture 
of the NDB is worked out these strategic interplays might constrain the NDB from working 
to its full potential.  
However the most critical issue that keeps getting overlooked in discussion of the NDB is 
that this institution does little to address questions of productivity growth and employment 
generation in these countries. Both the IMF and World Bank have failed in their original 
mandate to help solve the problem of persistent deficits in the developing world. The NDB, 
the bank for and of the developing world, also seems to provide little direction in this regard. 
Four out of the five BRICS countries have chronic trade deficits and lagging productivity 
growth and need financing strategies for investing in competitiveness and even China with 
its mighty trade surplus faces challenges of moving into innovation and creating global 
brands. The NDB provides no new financing strategies to address these challenges. 
 
